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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax Nexus
by Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. is perhaps the most 
important state and local tax decision in recent 
decades.1 However, the Court’s ruling in Wayfair 
was rather narrow, leaving many important 
questions unanswered. This is the second in a 
series of articles evaluating Wayfair and analyzing 
some of the questions raised by that opinion.2 In 
this article, we address issues related to sales tax 
formalism and income tax nexus.
Wayfair and Sales Tax Formalism
The Wayfair Court’s reversal of Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota3 was consistent with the Court’s 
general trend away from formalism in its dormant 
commerce clause cases, and the Court partially 
justified its decision on that ground.4 But the 
physical presence rule was not the only historic 
formalism implicated in Wayfair. Since the 1940s, 
the Court has prevented states from imposing 
their sales taxes on transactions that are 
completed out of state.5 Nevertheless, the Court 
allows states to impose economically equivalent 
use taxes on the in-state consumption of the 
purchased items.6 To avoid discrimination against 
interstate commerce, states’ use tax rates are set at 
or below their sales tax rates and states provide 
credits against their use taxes for any sales taxes 
previously paid. This system is economically 
equivalent to destination sourcing the sales tax, 
but states must abide by this formal structure.
The source of this formalism is the Court’s 
1944 decision in McLeod v. Dilworth.7 That case 
involved a challenge to an Arkansas sales tax that 
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In this edition of 
Academic Perspectives on SALT, the authors, in 
the second of a series of articles on Wayfair, 
discuss sales tax formalism and the extent to 
which it survives post-Wayfair.
1
South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
2
Our first article tackled some of the more immediate interpretive 
questions raised by Wayfair, such as how a state should approach dealing 
with questions about substantial nexus and undue burden. That article 
recommended that states take note of the features of South Dakota’s law 
that appealed to the Court and aim to replicate or improve on those 
features to the extent possible. Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and 
David Gamage, “Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden,” State 
Tax Notes, Aug. 2, 2018, p. 447.
3
504 U.S. 298 (1992).
4
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094-95.
5
McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
6
General Trading Co. v. Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
7
Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 327.
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applied to transactions consummated out of state 
but shipped to Arkansas customers. The Court 
struck down that sales tax as unconstitutional 
even though it recognized the broad equivalency 
of state sales and use taxes and upheld the 
imposition of the latter in a case that it decided the 
same day.8 The Court based its holding on the fact 
that the two taxes were “different in conception” 
and “assessments upon different transactions.”9
The Dilworth formalism has stood since the 
1940s. Yet it is unclear whether and to what extent 
this formalism still holds post-Wayfair. The South 
Dakota statute that was challenged in Wayfair 
conflicted with both Quill and Dilworth by 
requiring remote vendors to collect the state’s 
sales tax rather than its use tax.10 The litigation, 
however, focused only on the Quill precedent. 
Neither the parties nor the Court addressed the 
Dilworth issue.
It is unclear to us whether the Court 
consciously avoided the issue or whether the 
Court just did not appreciate that aspect of the 
case. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s opinion 
explicitly noted that the South Dakota statute 
imposed a sales tax collection obligation, but the 
reference seems to have been more colloquial than 
technical. Read in its entirety, Wayfair suggests 
that the Court viewed the difference in the taxes 
as a difference in who remits them — sales taxes 
being collected and remitted by vendors and use 
taxes being paid directly by consumers.11 That 
distinction is largely true, of course, but it is not 
the relevant substantive distinction between the 
two taxes. The Dilworth Court was right — the 
taxes are “different in conception” and 
“assessments upon different transactions.”12
It may be that the Wayfair Court was willing to 
ignore this issue because the parties did not raise 
it. The majority opinion did state that “all concede 
that taxing the sales in question here is lawful.”13 
Perhaps that was the Court’s way of saying that 
the Dilworth issue had been waived, but it is 
unclear. The Court remanded the case to the 
South Dakota courts to resolve other non-Quill 
objections. The biggest issue flagged by the Court 
was whether South Dakota’s law would fail the 
balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church,14 but it may 
be that the South Dakota statute also remains 
vulnerable under Dilworth. The Court certainly 
did not explicitly overrule that case in Wayfair.
The uncertainty involving this issue leads us 
to conclude that the better course for states would 
be to continue to abide by the Dilworth formalism 
and to enact their economic nexus standards 
through their use tax systems. It seems unlikely 
that the Court will clarify this area of law any time 
soon, if ever. Nevertheless, if states want to adopt 
sales tax collection obligations using the South 
Dakota model, they will need to ensure that their 
statutes impose the tax as a substantive matter. 
South Dakota’s law appears to do so because the 
state is a member of the Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement, which sources sales to where 
customers take delivery of property if they use a 
shipping company to pick up their orders.15 States 
that have adopted the SSUTA should therefore 
not have a problem with this issue, but other 
states might. If they are going to impose sales tax 
collection obligations, they should ensure that 
their statutes operate similarly.
Ultimately, this is an issue that is easy to plan 
around. States can follow the historic Dilworth 
formalism and require remote vendors to collect 
their use taxes. However, if states want to follow 
South Dakota’s lead, they should ensure that their 
statutes impose sales tax on out-of-state sales. 
Though we do not think the Court meant to 
overrule Dilworth by implication, this is an issue 
worth watching. In our increasingly 
interconnected economy, we can imagine states 
8
General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 335.
9
Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.
10
S.B. 106, 2016 Leg. Assembly, 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).
11
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087 (“When a consumer purchases goods or 
services, the consumer’s State often imposes a sales tax. This case 
requires the Court to determine when an out-of-state seller can be 
required to collect and remit that tax.” (Id. at 2088) “South Dakota has a 
sales tax. . . . Sellers are generally required to collect and remit this tax. If 
for some reason the sales tax is not remitted by the seller, then in-state 
consumers are separately responsible for paying a use tax at the same 
rate.” (Id.) “Under this Court’s decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill, South 
Dakota may not require a business to collect its sales tax if the business 
lacks a physical presence in the State.”).
12
Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.
13
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
14
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
15
S.D. Codified Laws sections 10-45-2, 10-45-108; S.D. Admin. R. 
section 64:06:01:62(1); and Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
sections 310, 311.
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having good reasons to tax or regulate 
transactions arguably consummated entirely out 
of state.16 If the formalism of Dilworth is no more, 
then the states might be able to tax such 
transactions.
Wayfair and Income Tax Nexus
On July 13 Wells Fargo CFO John Shrewsberry 
announced that the company was making a $481 
million adjustment to its earnings based on 
Wayfair.17 That adjustment was not because of the 
company’s potential sales tax exposure, but rather 
because some of its affiliated entities had been 
relying on Quill to avoid paying income taxes in 
some states. That position does not appear to have 
been unique to Wells Fargo,18 but it was 
aggressive. States and taxpayers have debated 
whether Quill applies to income taxes for some 
time, but state courts have nearly universally held 
that it does not.19 Wells Fargo apparently did not 
agree, and technically the question was 
undecided because the Supreme Court had 
declined to opine on the issue. Wayfair leaves no 
doubt, and by reversing Quill, the Court settled 
this issue.
What the Court did not settle regarding 
income taxes is the same question it left open 
regarding sales taxes — how far can states go with 
nexus? As we discussed in our prior article,20 the 
Court referred to its Polar Tankers21 opinion in 
stating that “nexus is established when the 
taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in 
that jurisdiction.”22 The Wayfair Court then 
analyzed respondents’ nexus by reference to their 
“economic and virtual contacts” with South 
Dakota.23 Unfortunately, the Court did not expand 
on what those terms meant or when they were 
sufficient for nexus. The Court merely stated that 
South Dakota’s threshold amounts — $100,000 in 
sales or 200 transactions — were sufficient to 
ensure that respondents had the required 
economic contacts and that respondents’ statuses 
as “large, national companies” meant that they 
“undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual 
presence.”24
The Court’s limited nexus analysis does not 
provide much direct guidance for states or 
taxpayers, but this is hardly surprising. The 
Court’s minimal approach was entirely consistent 
with how state courts had decided economic 
nexus cases over the last two decades.25 It was also 
consistent with the Court’s general desire to craft 
its decisions as narrowly as possible. 
Nevertheless, states and taxpayers can glean some 
guidance by looking at the origin of the physical 
presence rule, the facts at issue in Wayfair, and the 
nature of the state income tax.
First, we know that Quill and National Bellas 
Hess26 imposed the physical presence rule largely 
because of the perceived compliance burdens 
associated with sales tax collections,27 and that 
those burdens are largely attributable to the large 
number of local jurisdictions with consumption 
tax authority and the differences in tax bases 
among jurisdictions. In addition, notwithstanding 
the continued existence of those compliance costs, 
the Wayfair Court found that South Dakota’s sales 
thresholds were high enough to satisfy the nexus 
requirement in a post-Quill world. This means 
that $100,001 of sales or 200 transactions is enough 
of an economic connection to justify the 
compliance costs associated with use tax 
collections.
How does the compliance cost of state 
corporate income taxes compare? Certainly there 
16
Association for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 
2018) (striking down Maryland’s attempt to control specified drug prices 
because “it controls the price of transactions that occur wholly outside 
the state”). For critical discussion of this decision, see Shanske and Jane 
Horvath, “Maryland’s Generic Drug Pricing Law Is Constitutional: A 
Recent Decision Misunderstands the Structure of the Industry,” Health 
Affairs Blog (June 22, 2018).
17
See Andrea Muse, “Wells Fargo Adjusts Income Tax Reserves 
Following Wayfair,” State Tax Notes, July 17, 2018, p. 397.
18
See id. (quoting a prominent accounting firm leader as saying that 
“the physical presence standard has long been thought to apply for 
determinations of substantial nexus for state income tax purposes”).
19
See Thimmesch, “The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus,” 13 Fla. 




Polar Tankers Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009).
22




Id. Earlier in the Court’s opinion, it discussed “virtual presences” in 
the context of “virtual showrooms,” presumably a website. Id. at 2095.
25
See Thimmesch, supra note 19, at 173-181 (discussing how state 
courts have defined economic nexus).
26
National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 
(1967).
27
See Gamage and Devin Heckman, “A Better Way Forward for State 
Taxation of E-Commerce,” 92 B.U. L. Rev. 483, 493-94 (2012).
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are far fewer jurisdictions that levy corporate 
income taxes and they generally resemble one 
another, including by piggybacking on the federal 
income tax for purposes of defining the tax base. 
Of course, the corporate income tax is likely a 
more complicated tax for many taxpayers for 
other reasons.28 We don’t have a strong opinion as 
to how this should come out except to note that 
states adopting factor nexus thresholds should be 
confident that their tests will withstand scrutiny 
as long as their thresholds do not dip 
unreasonably low relative to the Wayfair 
thresholds. The $500,000 threshold contained in 
the Multistate Tax Commission’s model law 
seems safe, as does Michigan’s lower $350,000 
threshold.29 It is not difficult to see that even lower 
thresholds could pass constitutional muster based 
on Wayfair.
Not all states will want to adopt quantitative 
rules, and, notably, many states currently apply 
qualitative standards.30 Opining on the 
constitutionality of those standards is more 
difficult and those standards may be more 
susceptible to challenge than are bright-line rules 
if they do not provide protections for smaller 
businesses. We would therefore recommend that 
states with nexus standards adopt de minimis 
protections, at least administratively, if they want 
to avoid challenge. States should have little 
economic interest in pursuing taxpayers with low 
in-state income in any event, so establishing 
minimum protections for taxpayers seems 
advisable to avoid costly litigation. De minimis 
rules can also put taxpayers on notice as to what 
levels of sales will draw scrutiny and help to fight 
against taxpayer recalcitrance.
Of course, nexus is not the only constraint on 
state corporate income taxes. States remain bound 
by Public Law 86-272,31 and they apparently also 
must ensure that their statutes do not run afoul of 
the Court’s Pike balancing test.32 The constraints of 
P.L. 86-272 are familiar, however, and it is unlikely 
that any corporate income tax we know of would 
fail Pike balancing. 
28
Compare Tax Commissioner of West Virginia v. MBNA America Bank 
N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 233-234 (W. Va. 2007) (majority justifying a less 
exacting nexus threshold for income taxes based on the lower 
compliance burdens associated with those taxes) with id. at 240 (dissent 
arguing that corporate income taxes are more burdensome).
29
See Mich. Comp. Laws section 206.621(1).
30
See Thimmesch, supra note 19, at 181-84.
31
Though there is an argument that the broad concept of nexus in 
Wayfair will narrow the interpretation of “solicitation” in P.L. 86-272. See 
Jaye Calhoun and William J. Kollarik II, “Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Historic Decision in Wayfair,” State Tax Notes, July 9, 2018, p. 125.
32
Supra note 2.
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